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Four million blacks left the South from 1940 to 1970, doubling the northern black workforce. I exploit
variation in migrant flows within skill groups over time to estimate the elasticity of substitution by
race. I then use this estimate to calculate counterfactual rates of wage growth. I find that black wages
in the North would have been around 7 percent higher in 1970 if not for the migrant influx, while white
wages would have remained unchanged. On net, migration was an avenue for black economic advancement,
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The economic position of African-Americans improved dramatically during the Second 
World War and the subsequent decades, both absolutely and relative to whites. In 1940, the 
average black worker earned only 43 percent as much as the average white worker; by 1970, the 
black-white earnings ratio rose to 64 percent.
1 This relative growth in black wages can be 
attributed both to a rise in the demand for black labor, as discrimination in the labor market 
abated, and to a rise in the supply of skills offered by an increasingly well-educated black 
workforce. Inter-regional migration also played a role. From 1940 to 1970, four million blacks 
moved from the low wage South to the higher wage North. James Smith and Finis Welch 
estimate that migration accounts for around 20 percent of black-white wage convergence during 
this period.
2 
Scholarship on the Great Black Migration has focused almost exclusively on the wage 
gains realized by migrants themselves.
3 However, a migration this large likely had ramifications 
for the receiving economy as well. In particular, competition from migrant arrivals may have 
reduced the wages of existing northern workers. While black migration only increased the 
northern labor force by 4.5 percent, the number of black workers in the North more than 
doubled. If the average black and white workers were perfect substitutes, black migration would 
have been a drop in a very large bucket, likely having a negligible effect on the average northern 
wage. If instead black migrants were closer substitutes to existing black workers, the negative 
                                                 
1 Author’s calculations for men who meet the sample inclusion criteria described in the data section. 
2 Smith and Welch, “Black Economic Progress.” See also Maloney, “Wage Compression”; and Margo, “Explaining 
Black-White Wage.” 
3 Economic historians have also explored how the southern economy adjusted to the loss of black agricultural labor. 
Margo, “Segregated Schools,”argues that the threat of black mobility prompted white planters to improve the quality 
of black schools in the South. Grove and Heinicke, “Better Opportunities,” assess – and reject – the hypothesis that 
the invention and diffusion of the mechanical cotton picker was a response to black out-migration. In The Southern 
Diaspora, Gregory offers a comprehensive historical account of how black and white migration from the South 




wage effects of black migration would be concentrated among the small group of northern 
blacks. 
In this paper, I calculate what the pace of black and white wage growth in the North 
would have been from 1940 and 1970 in the absence of southern migration. The key parameter 
in this counterfactual exercise is the elasticity of substitution by race. Following George Borjas 
and Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, I start with a production function in which an 
aggregate labor input is subdivided into skill groups by education and experience level.
4 Workers 
are assumed to be perfect substitutes with others of the same race and skill group, but to be 
imperfect substitutes with those of a different race or skill level. The elasticity of substitution by 
race can be recovered by estimating the relationship between changes in the black-white wage 
gap and changes in the ratio of black to white labor supply within a skill group over time. 
Southern migration generates shocks to the racial composition of northern skill groups that can 
be used to identify this parameter.  
I find that white wages fall as either black or white labor flows into a skill group but that 
black wages are only sensitive to black labor supply. The implied elasticity of substitution 
between similarly-skilled black and white men ranges from 5.4 to 11.1 and is estimated with 
enough precision to reject perfect substitution. This finding is robust to reclassifying skill groups 
by occupation rather than education and to using an instrumental variables procedure intended to 
address the concern that southerners choose to move North when wages in their race-by-skill cell 
are high. By this metric, blacks and whites were more substitutable in the postwar North than are 
foreign- and native-born workers within similarly-defined skill groups today (elasticity = 5.6; 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). However, we must use caution when comparing across time periods 
                                                 
4 Borjas, “The Labor Demand Curve”; and Ottaviano and Peri, “Rethinking the Effects.”  Borjas was, in turn, 
building on Welch, “Effects,”who developed a similar framework to explore the effect of changes in the age 




because substitutability in the labor market, both across education groups and across experience 
levels, also appears to have been higher in the past. 
The low elasticity of substitution between black and white workers in the same skill 
group could be driven by either direct discrimination in job assignment or differences in 
unobserved skill.
5 The average black student likely attended schools of lower quality than the 
average white student, particularly in the de jure segregated South. Southern black schools 
offered fewer resources per pupil and shorter school terms.
6 To disentangle direct discrimination 
from unobserved skill, I re-estimate the model with skill groups defined by likely days, rather 
than years, of completed schooling and I find that school quality can explain around two-thirds 
of the imperfect substitutability by race with the broader skill cells. Given the evidence of 
differences in unobserved skills, statistical discrimination may provide a third explanation for the 
lack of interchangeability between black and white workers. The arrival of lower-skilled black 
workers from the South could reduce wage offers for northern-born blacks if employers infer a 
worker’s ability from the average skill level in his race-by-education group. 
Using the estimated elasticity of substitution by race within skill groups, I calculate what 
the black-white wage gap would have been in the North under a no-migration scenario. The 
actual wage gap between blacks and whites in the North declined by 15 log points from 1940 to 
1970. I predict that, without southern migration, the wage gap would have declined by an 
additional five to seven points (30 to 50 percent). Incorporating the effect of new arrivals on 
existing black workers modifies the prevailing view of the Great Black Migration. Smith and 
                                                 
5 Another explanation for imperfect substitutability may be occupational or industrial specialization within groups. 
For example, Grant (2003) illustrates that in the late 19
th century German immigrants to the United States, who were 
concentrated in artisanal trades, were particularly susceptible to competition from craftsmen from Central and 
Eastern Europe. While, in theory, this channel could be operating in this context, the historical record is more 
consistent with labor market discrimination and differences in school quality. 




Welch estimate that the average black migrant experienced a 30 percent increase in annual 
earnings by moving northward.
7 This figure translates into a gain of $1,972 per migrant per year, 
or an aggregate gain of $7.88 billion for the four million migrants who made the journey (in 
$2000). The three million blacks already in the North in 1940 started with higher average annual 
earnings of $10,509. A 7 to 10 percent decline in wages due to labor market competition 
translates into an aggregate loss of $2.21 to $3.15 billion for this group. While, on net, migration 
was an avenue for black economic advancement, the migration had clear winners and losers.  
 
II. Wage convergence and inter-regional migration, 1940-1970 
 
A. Black-white wage convergence by region 
African-Americans experienced two major episodes of wage convergence in the 
twentieth century, one during the 1940s and the other during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Table 1 presents decadal changes in the black-white wage gap, both nationally and by region. In 
every region, the sharpest decline in the black-white wage gap occurred in the 1940s, with blacks 
experiencing the largest relative gains in the Midwest and the West. Both of these regions 
exhibited strong labor demand during World War II, particularly in defense-related industry, 
where black wages may have been further buoyed by President Roosevelt’s executive order 
forbidding discrimination on the basis of race in firms holding government contracts.
8  
Black wages diverged slightly from white wages in the 1950s, a decade of slow growth 
following the war. Convergence returned in the 1960s, particularly in the South. John J. Donohue 
and James Heckman argue that, given the uniformity of black wage growth by age group, it is 
                                                 
7 Smith and Welch, “Black Economic Progress.” The return to migration may not have been as high in real terms 
given the cost of living differences between the two regions. 




unlikely that black educational attainment can explain this round of convergence. Instead, they 
suggest that strong convergence in South is most consistent with an increase in the demand for 
black labor following a series of federal interventions in the southern labor market.
9 Since 1975, 




B. Southern Migration to the North 
The growth of industrial production during World War II attracted southern migrants to 
northern cities. Table 2 demonstrates that the black share of the northern workforce increased 
from 3.9 to 5.3 percent (36 percent) over the 1940s. 80 percent of this increase was due to new 
migrant arrivals. The size of this flow is akin to the high rate of immigration to the United States 
in the 1990s, when the foreign-born share of the population increased from 7.4 to 10.3 percent 
(39 percent). The war also ushered in a large flow of white southern migrants, which is apparent 
in the third column of Table 2.
11 The pace of southern migration slowed in the 1950s, and then 
reversed in the 1960s.  
In-migration generated an 102 percent increase in the black labor supply in the average 
skill cell.
12 The extent of this migration-induced increase in black labor supply varied by 
education level. In 1940, 9.6 percent of northern workers with an elementary education (0-5 
years of schooling) were black southerners. The black migrant share of the labor force in this 
                                                 
9 Donohue and Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic Change.” See also Heckman and Payner, “Determining the 
Impact.” 
10 Bound and Freeman, “What Went Wrong?”; Grogger, “Does School Quality”; Amitabh Chandra, “Is the 
Convergence”; Derek A. Neal, “Why Has Black-White Skill Convergence.” 
11 Gregory, The Southern Diaspora. 
12 Due to an earlier wave of black migration, 62 percent of the northern black labor force was already composed of 
southern-born men in 1940. Despite a large migrant flow over the next thirty years, the migrant share of the black 
labor force remained relatively constant. The first wave of black migration corresponded to the growth in industrial 
employment during the first World War and the introduction of immigration quotas in 1924, which slowed 




group doubled by 1960. In contrast, while only 1.5 percent of men with 8-10 years of school 
were black migrants in 1940, the black migrant share of this group tripled over the next twenty 
years. The counterfactual exercise at the heart of this paper calculates alternative wage levels for 
black and white workers under different assumptions about the percentage change in black labor 
supply. In general, lower education groups had a larger black presence in 1940 but experienced 
smaller migration flows in percentage terms over the next 20 to 30 years.  
 
C. Evidence of Labor Market Segmentation by Race  
In the mid-twentieth century, blacks and whites in the northern workforce possessed very 
different skill levels. Figure 1 presents the distribution of educational attainment for three groups 
of men working in the North in 1950: whites, southern-born blacks and northern-born blacks.
13 
While northern-born blacks were better educated than their southern-born counterparts, both 
groups lagged behind whites in the North. For example, 19 percent of young southern-born 
blacks had graduated from high school, compared to 28 percent of northern-born blacks and 39 
percent of whites. Among older workers, only 5 percent of southern-born blacks had graduated 
from high school, compared to 10 percent of northern-born blacks and 16 percent of whites. 
Even among men with the same years of schooling and job experience, black workers 
often found themselves limited to a proscribed set of occupations and tasks. Case studies 
document that blacks were prevented from working at some firms, holding certain occupations – 
including skilled crafts, retail, and clerical work – and ascending to supervisory positions.
14 
                                                 
13 In the main results, the category “white” includes both whites born in the North and foreign-born whites residing 
in the North. Table 6 presents separate estimates of the elasticity of substitution between black and white workers by 
white nativity status. 
14 See, for example, Bodnar, Simon and Weber, Lives; Trotter, Black Milwaukee; Gottlieb, Making Their Own Way; 




Overtly discriminatory hiring practices were banned in many northern states in the 1940s 
and 1950s.
15 Before that time, some firms simply refused to hire black workers. For example, for 
many years Ford Motor Company was the only automobile manufacturer in Detroit willing to 
hire black employees. As a result, in the early 1940s, Ford employed 50 percent of black 
Detroiters and only 14 percent of local whites.
16 
Even within “integrated” firms, blacks faced limited job opportunities. In manufacturing, 
blacks were often restricted to the hottest, dirtiest, or most dangerous parts of the factory. At the 
United States Steel Corporation in Pittsburgh, for example, “black men could advance no higher 
than first helper in the open hearth department”.
17 Joe William Trotter describes a similar process 
in Milwaukee, whereby tanneries employed blacks only in “the beam house, where dry hides 
were placed into pits filled with lime to remove hair,” and packinghouses “relegated Afro-
Americans to the worst occupations…[in which they] unloaded trucks, slaughtered animals, 
transported intestines, and generally cleaned the plant”.
18 
Case studies of particular industries emphasize that race-based job assignments cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by skill differentials alone.
19 Many factory positions required only a few 
weeks of on-the-job training. As one of Gottlieb’s interview subjects in Pittsburgh, Wesley M., 
attests: “I worked in that mill and I have learned those white boy[…] jobs. [They] would put 
them on my job, [and I would] learn them their jobs, but still I couldn’t get the [better] job”.
20 
Blacks were barred from crafts and trade work not for lack of ability but because all-white or 
segregated unions limited their access to apprenticeships.
21 Similarly, blacks were bypassed for 
                                                 
15 Collins, “The Political Economy.” 
16 Maloney and Whatley, “Making the Effort.” 
17 Gottlieb, Making Their Own Way, p. 98-99. 
18 Trotter, Black Milwaukee, p. 53. 
19 Wright, Old South. 
20 Gottlieb, Making Their Own Way, p. 100. 




promotion because many white workers refused to report to a black boss.
22 Even in West 
Virginia’s relatively equitable coal mining industry, in which blacks had access to high-skilled 
machine-cutting jobs, black workers rarely attained a supervisory position.
23  
Census records provide supporting evidence of occupational segregation by race.
24 As 
one illustration, Figure 2 depicts the fifteen most commonly-held occupations among northern-
born men with exactly an eighth grade education in 1950. Only three jobs – truck drivers, 
mechanics, and clerical workers – employ a sizeable share of men of both races. Black men are 
most likely to work in the stereotypical positions of janitor, cook, porter, and service worker, 
while white men hold three union posts (mine operatives, carpenters, and machinists), two 
supervisory positions (foremen and managers) and one position that requires interaction with the 
public (salesman).  
 
III. A Framework for Estimating the Effect of Black Migration on Northern Wages 
 
 A. Theoretical Framework 
The historical record provides suggestive evidence that similarly-skilled blacks and 
whites were not perfect substitutes in the northern labor market. The migration of black 
southerners may therefore have represented a larger competitive shock to existing black workers 
than to their white counterparts. This section lays out a simple production function to 
demonstrate the conditions under which black in-migration from South would have slowed 
relative black wage growth in the North. The rest of the paper will use this framework, along 
                                                 
22 Sundstrom, “The Color Line.” 
23 Fishback, “Segregation.” 




with estimated elasticity parameters, to calculate the effect of migration on the wages of existing 
black workers. 
The analysis is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function in which capital (K) and 
labor (L) are combined to produce output: 
     
Y = A L
α K
1-α         ( 1 )  
 
Following Borjas and Ottaviano and Peri, I model labor as a composite of education groups (e), 
experience levels within education groups (x), and two racial groups (black and white) within 
each education-experience cell (r).
25 Each nested function exhibits constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES). The construction of the labor composite is detailed in the Theory Appendix. 
  This production function embeds a set of assumptions about the role of race in the 
northern labor market. First, as with any neo-classical production function, it is assumed that 
workers are paid the value of their marginal product. In this model, black workers may be paid 
less than whites with the same level of education and experience only because of discrimination 
in job assignment, not because of unequal pay for the performance of identical tasks. This 
assumption appears to be consistent with the historical evidence; available payroll data show that 
black and white men employed in the same job at the same firm were usually paid the same 
wage.
26 Of more concern is the assumption that the wages of workers in one skill group can only 
be affected by the labor supply in another group if the elasticity of substitution between these 
groups is high. In the presence of statistical discrimination, the arrival of low-skilled blacks from 
the South could harm the job prospects of all black workers, including those of high-skill, if 
                                                 
25 Borjas, “The Labor Demand Curve”; and Ottaviano and Peri, “Rethinking the Effects.” 




employers use a single category to form expectations about black workers .
27 Concerned that 
rural migrants would reflect poorly on existing black workers, northern black newspapers 
published cartoons and editorials admonishing migrants to arrive punctually at work and to dress 
appropriately .
28 In the presence of such widespread statistical discrimination, the wage effects 
estimated here would be a lower bound. 
In a competitive equilibrium, we can recover the wages of men with education level e, 
experience x, and race r by differentiating equation 1 with respect to Lexr:
29 
 
ln wexr = ln(A
1/ακ
(1-α)/α) + 1/δ ln(L) + lnθe - (1/δ - 1/η) ln(Le) + lnθex - (1/η - 1/σ)ln(Lex) + lnθexr - 1/σ ln(Lexr)        (2) 
 
Wages depend positively on the own education-, experience- and race-specific productivity 
terms (θ) and negatively on own-group labor supply. The extent to which labor supply in 
adjacent groups reduces own-group wages is determined by the elasticities of substitution by 
education (δ), experience (η) and race (σ). 
Equation 2 allows us to analyze the effect of black migration on the wages of white and 
black workers in the North.
30 Let’s start with the case of white workers in the education-
experience group e-x. A portion of the black migration flows directly into this skill group. Black 
migration into group e-x has the following effect on the wages of white workers in this cell: 
  
Δwsxw/wsxw = [1/δ + (1/η - 1/δ) (1/se) + (1/σ - 1/η)(1/sex)] · sexb · ΔLsxb/Lsxb         (3) 
 
                                                 
27 Lieberson, A Piece of the Pie. 
28 Grossman, Land of Hope. 
29 Following Ottaviano and Peri (2006), I first express output as a function of the capital-output ratio (κ = K/Y); this 
substitution will become useful later on. 
30 A general expression for the effect of an increase in the supply of factor b on the wages of factor a is given by 
d log wa/dlogLb = sb YabY/YaYb, where sb is the share of income earned by factor b and Yx denotes the partial 




Other migrants have the same amount of education but different experience levels, while still 
others are in different education groups. These arrivals further influence the wages of white 
works in e-x: 
  
Δwsxw/wsxw = [1/δ + (1/η - 1/δ) (1/se)] · sexb · ΔLsxb/Lsxb             (4) 
  Δwsxw/wsxw = 1/δ · sexb · ΔLsxb/Lsxb                  ( 5 )  
 
Adding equations (3)-(5) across all skill groups contributing to the migration flow indicates the 
total effect of the migration on the wage of white workers in group e-x: 
 
Δwsxw/wsxw = 1/δ ΣiΣj (sijbΔLijb/Lijb) + (1/η - 1/δ) (1/se) Σj (sejbΔLejb/Lejb) + (1/σ - 1/η) (1/sex) (sexbΔLexb/Lexb)       (6) 
 
Equation 6 demonstrates that white wages will fall with entry into the group’s own education 
level and education-experience cell (terms 2 and 3). As a counterweight, wages will rise with an 
increase in labor supply into skill cells that are complements in production (term 1). For the time 
being, I will maintain the assumption that capital completely adjusts with the new labor supply, 
in which case we can ignore the impact of this inflow on K or the capital-labor ratio. I will relax 
this assumption below. 
The effect of black migration on the wages of black workers in skill group e-x is nearly 
identical to equation 6, but contains an additional term capturing the potentially imperfect 
elasticity of substitution between men of different races in the same skill group: 
 
Δwexb/wexb  = Δwexw/wexw - 1/σ (ΔLexb/Lexb)              (7) 
 
In the case of perfect substitution, σ is equal to ∞ and black migration will have an equal effect 
on black and white wages in the same skill group. If σ is less than ∞, the arrival of new black 




Equations 6 and 7 demonstrate the effect of an increase in black labor supply on the 
wages of white and black men in a specific skill cell (e-x). The effect on average black and white 
wages will be a weighted sum of these cell-specific effects. Black migration will have a larger 
effect on average black wages if: (1) the skill distributions of whites and blacks are sufficiently 
different, or (2) the elasticity of substitution by race (σ) is low, augmenting the effect of black 
migration on black wages within each skill cell. 
 
B. Estimating Equation 
Obtaining an unbiased estimate of the elasticity of substitution by race (σ) is central to 
understanding the effect of black migration on relative black wage growth in the North. A simple 
expression for σ can be found by taking the ratio of black to white wages in a skill group e-x 
from equation 2: 
 
ln(wexb/wexw)  = -1/σ ln(Lexb/Lexw) + ln(θexb/θexw)           (8) 
 
The black-white wage gap in skill group e-x is a function of the ratio of black to white labor 
supply in that group and the ratio of the race-specific productivity terms. If blacks and whites are 
perfect substitutes (σ = ∞), the wage ratio will be invariant to relative supply. A positive 
coefficient on the relative supply term implies that black and white workers in the same skill are 
not used interchangeably in production (σ ≠ ∞). 
I estimate a version of equation 8 by pooling data from four Census years (1940-1970):
  
  
ln(wexbt/wexwt)  = β ln(Lexbt/Lexwt) + e + x + τ + (e · x) + (e · τ) + (x · τ) + εexbt
 /εexwt       (9)
 
 




The regression contains fixed effects for education levels (e), work experience (x), and Census 
year (τ) and all two-way interactions. The interactions (e · τ) and (x · τ) allow the returns to 
schooling and experience to change over time, and the interaction (e · x) allows experience 
profiles to differ by education. The implied elasticity of substitution (σ) is equal to -1/β. β is 
identified from changes in relative black-white labor supply within a skill group over time. These 
changes can occur with differential rates of either educational attainment or in-migration. In the 
empirical analysis, I will focus on changes driven by migration. 
 
C. Data and Definitions 
I construct a skill group-level dataset from Census samples compiled by the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The northern economy is partitioned into forty skill cells 
in each year based on five education categories and eight experience intervals.
31 I define five 
levels of educational attainment: elementary school (0-5 years of schooling), middle school (6-9 
years of schooling), high school attendees (10-11 years of schooling), high school graduates (12 
years of schooling) and men with at least some college (13 or more years of schooling). I 
consider alternative divisions as a robustness exercise below. 
Because the Census does not collect information on work experience, I assign each 
individual a predicted level of work experience based on his age and years of completed 
schooling. I allow men to begin accruing labor market experience in the year after they leave 
school, but constrain the earliest age of labor market entry to be 13. Work experience is thus 
defined as [age - max{education + 6, 12}]. I consider individuals who, by this measure, have one 
                                                 
31 I allocate all men between the ages of 18 and 64 who are employed in the northern labor force into a skill cell, 




to 40 years of work experience and divide this group into five-year intervals (1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 
years, et cetera).
32 
The dependent variable in the estimating equation is the ratio of annual earnings for 
blacks and whites in a skill cell.
33 The earnings ratio is calculated only for northern-born men 
who are not enrolled in school, self-employed, or working part time (fewer than 40 hours per 
week).
34 Including southern migrants in the earnings measure would lead to composition bias. 
Migrants contribute more toward average earnings in cells with higher in-migration rates. 
Because southern black migrants earned more than their northern-born counterparts, even upon 
first arrival in the North, including migrants in the earnings ratio would bias against finding 
negative wage effects of migration.
35  
The key right-hand side variable in the estimating equation is the black-white labor 
supply ratio in a skill cell. Temporal variation in this ratio is driven by changes across birth 
cohorts due either to migration from the South or to changes in the distribution of education 
among the northern-born.
36 Men are more likely to stay in school if they perceive high returns to 
doing so. As a result, educational upgrading across cohorts may be positively correlated with the 
race-specific productivity terms in equation 8. To avoid this source of bias, most of the paper 
focuses on variation induced by migration flows. I discuss concerns with this source of variation 
                                                 
32 Men with 0-5 years of education accrue 1-5 years of experience between the ages of 13 and 18. Because entry into 
the sample begins at age 18, the lowest experience cell is unobserved for men in this education group. The 
remaining sample contains 156 skill cells (4 years · 5 education groups · 8 experience levels - 4 cells). 
33 While I refer to non-blacks as “whites” throughout the paper, this group contains a small number of Asians and 
Native Americans. 
34 Excluding part-time workers and the self-employed is necessary to ensure comparability across Census years. In 
1940, the Census did not collect information on self-employment income. In addition, in that year workers reported 
the number of weeks worked full time, whereas in all subsequent years respondents reported any week in which they 
had worked for pay (Margo, 1995). Finally, I exclude full-time workers who report making less than one-half of the 
prevailing federal minimum wage and replace top-coded incomes with 1.4 times the top-code (Goldin and Margo, 
1992). 
35 Masters, “Are Black Migrants”; Long and Heltman, “Migration and Income Differences”; Margo, Race and 
Schooling; Vigdor, “The Pursuit.” 
36 For example, most of the men with 1-5 years of labor market experience in 1940 belong to the 1915-1920 birth 




in the next section. Southern migrants include all men who were born in a southern state and 
reside in the North.
37 For brevity, I often refer to a change in the number of black southerners in 
a skill cell as a “flow” of new black migrants though this change could, in principle, be due to 
reverse migration to the South. Summary statistics for annual earnings and labor supply by skill 
group are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
 
IV. Estimating the Elasticity of Substitution by Race within Skill Groups 
 
A. Baseline Results: Skill Groups Defined by Education and Experience Level 
Table 3 investigates the relationship between changes in the black-white wage gap and in 
the ratio of black to white migrant labor supply within skill cells. The first panel contains results 
from OLS regressions of the logarithm of black and white earnings (or their ratio) on the 
logarithm of black and white migrant labor supply. Skill cell-level observations are weighted by 
the number of northern-born men used to calculate the earnings ratio. As the first row 
demonstrates, black wages fall both in absolute terms and relative to white wages in skill cells 
that experience a migration-induced increase in relative black labor supply.
38 The coefficient in 
the first column implies an elasticity of substitution by race within skill group of 8.3 (=1/0.120). 
In the next two rows, I split the labor supply ratio in two and separately enter the levels of black 
and white migration. The wages of northern-born black men fall when black southerners in their 
skill cell move North, but increase slightly with white southern in-migration. On the other hand, 
                                                 
37 I cannot observe the inter-regional migration activity of the foreign-born. Implicitly, I assume here that the 
foreign-born do not relocate from South to North once they enter the country. The foreign-born are included with 
northern-born natives in calculating the dependent variables. I drop individuals whose birthplace is not reported (0.1 
percent of sample). 
38 Sundstrom (2007) finds a similar pattern across southern counties in 1940. Counties with a larger ratio of black-




an increase of either black or white labor supply reduces the wages of white workers to an equal 
degree.  
Estimating the relationship between the black-white wage gap and the full labor supply 
ratio, rather than the ratio of migrant labor supply, produces a coefficient that is only half as 
large and is not statistically significant (not shown). However, educational improvements across 
cohorts will bias the estimate upward if men invest in education when (expected) wage offers are 
high. Column 4 uses migration-induced changes to instrument for all changes in labor supply. 
The implied elasticity of substitution is similar when entering the migrant labor supply ratio 
directly. We can think of the main OLS equation as the reduced form of this two-stage least 
squares estimation process. 
One concern with the OLS regression is that southerners might choose to migrate when 
northern wages in their race-by-skill cell are high. In this case, migration flows will be correlated 
with unobserved race-specific productivity terms and OLS coefficients will be biased upward 
(see equation 8). One solution is to instrument for black and white migrant flows using the stock 
of southern-born men by race in a skill cell. The stock of southern-born men includes both men 
who chose to migrate North and men who chose to remain in the South.
39 The validity of this 
instrument rests on the assumption that neither demographic patterns nor educational upgrading 
in the South – two factors that affect the stock of southern-born men in each skill cell – are 
influenced by northern wages. This assumption may be violated if southerners consider the 
option of migrating to the North when making their human capital decisions. However, 
education decisions occur early in life. While these decisions are forward looking, it is unlikely 
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that southerners would have been able to predict race-specific wage patterns twenty or thirty 
years into the future. 
Table 4 presents a set of first stage results in which the stock of southern-born men in a 
skill cell is used to predict the flow of southern migrants to the North. The first stage regressions 
include the full set of dummy variables contained in the second stage. Not surprisingly, the stock 
of black southerners in a cell strongly predicts the southern black migrant flow into that cell in 
the North and the stock of white southerners predicts the white migrant flow; neither stock is 
significantly associated with the migration patterns of men of the opposite race.  
The second panel of Table 3 contains second stage coefficients from an IV regression that 
instruments for the migrant flows with the southern-born stocks. The qualitative pattern in the IV 
regressions is similar to OLS, but the standard errors increase. As a result, the effect of relative 
labor supply on black wages and the black-white wage gap is no longer significant. However, in 
comparing the point estimates, there is no evidence that the OLS coefficients are biased 
downward by endogenous relocation. If the migrant flow into a skill cell increases when race-
specific productivity (wages) are high, we would expect the IV coefficients to be larger in 
absolute value than their OLS counterparts. If anything, they are a little bit smaller. It is 
important to keep in mind that the migration decision entails a comparison of relative wages in 
the source and destination regions. Periods of increasing labor demand for black workers in the 
North could coincide with even larger increases in race-specific labor demand in the South.  
 
B. Accounting for Imperfect Substitution: Discrimination versus Unobserved Skill  
Thus far, the results suggest that blacks and whites with the same years of schooling and 




interchangeability could be due to discrimination in job assignment or to differences in 
unobserved skill, perhaps due to disparities in school quality. Neal and William R. Johnson 
(1996) document that black men score well below white men with identical years of reported 
schooling on standardized tests, suggesting that years of education is not a sufficient measure of 
skill. Some of this test score gap could be due to the lower quality of schools attended by the 
typical black student. De jure black schools in the South provided substantially fewer resources 
per pupil. As a result, black schools had higher pupil-teacher ratios and shorter term lengths 
(Margo, 1990). Other aspects of school quality, including the quality of teachers and peers, 
surely differed as well but remain unobserved.  
To disentangle discrimination from differences in unobserved skill, I adjust years of 
schooling for differences in school quality and re-estimate the elasticity of substitution within 
these more precisely defined skill groups. I focus on differences in the length of the school term 
because, while the literature is unequivocal that time spent in school earns a market return, it is 
mixed on the value added of small class sizes.
40 Using data on average term length by race, state 
of birth, and birth cohort, I convert years of completed schooling into likely days spent in the 
classroom.
41 I replace year-based education categories with day-based equivalents according to 
an 180 day school term. For example, the lowest education group translates into 900 or fewer 
days of likely school attendance, rather than five or fewer years of educational attainment. 
The first panel of Table 5 re-estimates the main results using these adjusted skill groups. 
The magnitude of the point estimates falls by two-thirds in this setting. The implied elasticity of 
substitution by race within skill cells is high (23.8  = 1/.042), but remains significantly different 
from perfect substitutability (that is, we can reject that β = 0). The qualitative patterns are similar 
                                                 
40 Hanushek, “The Evidence”; and Krueger and Whitmore, “The Effect.” 




to the results using the unadjusted skill groups. As before, black wages fall with an increase in 
black labor supply but are unaffected by changes in white labor supply. White wages are now 
sensitive only to white labor supply. One interpretation of this finding is that two-thirds of the 
estimated imperfect substitutability by race in Table 3 is driven by differences in the quality of 
education attained by blacks and whites, while the remaining one third is due to discrimination in 
job assignment for men with otherwise identical skill.
42 With better measures of school quality, 
the share of the imperfect substitution that can be attributed to discrimination may fall even 
further. 
 
C. Robustness Checks 
The baseline results involve a somewhat arbitrary partition of the economy into skill 
groups. This section considers the robustness of the results to alternative divisions of the 
economy and definitions of skill.  
In the mid-twentieth century, on-the-job training may have contributed as much to skill 
acquisition as did formal education. I construct alternative skill groups by experience level and 
occupation (rather than education), which classify occupations into six composite one-digit 
categories: professional/managerial; clerical/sales; crafts; operatives; unskilled labor; and 
service. The second panel of Table 5 conducts a parallel analysis by occupation-experience 
group. The point estimates are very similar in magnitude to the education-experience results in 
Table 3. Increasing the relative black labor supply in a skill group reduces the ratio of black to 
white wages, with an implied elasticity of substitution by race of 11.1 (= 1/0.090). 
                                                 
42 Alternatively, the lower point estimates may simply be due to measurement error. If term length is not closely 




The first panel of Table 6 considers a series of additional robustness exercises. Each row 
reports a coefficient from an OLS regression, the dependent variable of which is the black-white 
wage ratio. The alternate specifications add women to the labor supply counts; run an 
unweighted regression restricted to cells with 25 or more northern-born blacks; add men with 40-
50 years of labor market experience; and redefine education categories.
43 In these four 
supplementary regressions, the implied elasticities of substitution by race range from 5.5 to 12.5. 
The parameter estimate from the preferred specification in Table 3 (σ = 8.3) falls around the 
midpoint of this interval. With the exception of the specification that adds older men, the point 
estimates are all significant at least at the 10 percent level.  
The second panel of Table 6 re-estimates the preferred specification for sub-samples of 
interest. The limited sample size (156 skill cells) precludes testing for changes in the elasticity of 
substitution over time or between education groups. More modestly, I am able to show that the 
results are not being driven by the lowest or highest education groups (Panel B, rows 1 and 2). 
Finally, I restrict the wage data for white men to either native-born northerners (row 3) or the 
foreign-born living in the North (row 4). In both cases, the counts used to construct the relative 
labor supply ratio continue to include all southern-born white and black men in the northern 
workforce. Interestingly, foreign-born whites appear to be much more substitutable with black 
workers in their skill group than are native-born whites. The estimated elasticity by race for the 
foreign-born is 16.4 (=1/.061) and we cannot reject the possibility of perfect substitutability in 
this case. In contrast, the elasticity of 7.9 (=1/.126) between native-born whites and blacks is at 
the low end of the estimated range.  
                                                 
43 The earnings ratio is calculated for men alone even in the specification that adds women to the labor supply count. 
The original education groups were intended to reflect typical school categories. However, some elementary schools 
run through the 6
th grade and some high schools begin in the 9
th grade. The new education measure contains five 




V. Counterfactual Rates of Black-White Wage Convergence 
The theoretical framework illustrates how an influx of black workers could affect 
northern wages within the context of a neo-classical production function. According to the 
model, black migration would have had a larger effect on black wages if black and white 
workers occupy different portions of the skill distribution or if the elasticity of substitution 
within skill groups by race is low. In this section, I calculate counterfactual levels of wage 
convergence in the North within this framework. If there had been no new black migration to the 
North after 1940, would the wages of northern black workers have increased at a faster rate? 
Equations 6 and 7 detail how the wages of white and black workers change following a 
percentage change in black labor supply. The magnitude of these changes depend on the size of 
the labor supply shift due to black migration (ΔLexb/Lexb); income shares for black workers by 
skill group (sexb); and three elasticity estimates (δ, η, and σ). The first two components can be 
calculated directly from Census data. The elasticity of substitution by race within skill group (σ) 
was estimated in the previous section. Estimates of δ and η can be obtained by aggregating the 
workforce into education-experience groups or education categories alone and estimating the 
wage response to an increase in own-group labor supply over time. The resulting coefficients, 
which are based on data from 1940 to 1970, are 0.192 (s.e. = 0.044) and 0.266 (s.e. = 0.138). The 
elasticity of substitution implied by these coefficients is 5.20 across experience levels and 3.75 
across education groups. Comparing these results with Borjas’ (2003) more recent estimates of 
3.47 and 1.35 suggests that there was a greater scope for substitution across skill categories in the 
mid-twentieth century.
44  
                                                 
44 I conduct the counterfactual wage calculations using both sets of parameter estimates, and the results are almost 




In the counterfactual scenario, the northern black labor force is only allowed to grow 
through natural increase. The black migration flow into every skill group is set to zero. The 
percentage increase or decrease in average wages from 1940 to 1970 under this scenario (relative 
to their actual levels) are reported in Table 7. Wage effects are aggregated into five education 
categories by race. A positive sign indicates that wages would have been higher if not for the 
black migration flow. 
The wage effects in the first two columns are calculated using the OLS and IV estimates 
of σ respectively (Table 3). In both cases, limiting southern black migration would have had 
large positive effects on black wages, particularly for blacks with ten or more years of education. 
The lowest education groups already faced a large supply of black southerners from the first, 
World War I-based wave of migration. The flow of new migrants from 1940 to 1970 was only 
large enough to replace the pre-existing stock (Table 2). As a result, for low-skilled workers, the 
dominant effect of the migration was to increase complementary factors, thus increasing wages 
slightly (by around 1 percent). In contrast, while there were few southern blacks among the high 
school attendees and graduates in the northern labor force in 1940, the stock of southern blacks 
in these education groups tripled by 1970 (Table 2).  
The positive effect of quelling southern migration on middle- and high-skilled black 
workers are large enough to more than offset the small negative effects for low-skilled blacks. 
On average, I calculate that, if not for the ongoing southern migration, average black wages in 
the North would have been 7.2 to 9.6 percent higher by 1970. The distribution of wage effects is 
more uniform when focusing on the migrant flow in the 1940s (column 5). Over this decade, a 




migration in this period would have buoyed the wages of black elementary and middle school 
attendees as well. 
The second panel of Table 7 demonstrates that black migration had essentially no effect 
on white wages. Black migration simply did not represent a large enough increase in total 
northern labor supply to greatly influence white wages. Taken together, we can conclude that, 
absent migration, black workers would have experienced an additional 7 to 10 percent increase 
in wages relative to white workers. The foregone wage convergence in the North due to 
migration is large relative to actual wage growth. In 1940, northern blacks earned 45 percent less 
than northern whites (Table 1). Over the next thirty years, this gap declined by 15 log points. A 7 
to 10 percent increase in black wages (absent migration) would have translated into an additional 
5 to 7 percentage point reduction in the black-white wage gap.
45  
The final two columns in Table 7 examine the impact of black migration on northern 
wages under two alternative sets of assumptions. Column 3 recalculates the wage effects under 
the assumption that black and white workers are perfect substitutes within skill groups (β = 0 or 
σ = ∞). While, in theory, black migration may still have had a larger effect on existing black 
workers due to differences in skill distributions by race, I do not find this to be the case. Instead, 
ending black migration would have increased the wages of high school attendees and graduates 
of both races by around 1 percent and decreased the wages of less-educated men by an 
equivalent amount. These two effects would have been offsetting, and so black migration had 
little effect on the average wages of men of either race in this scenario. 
  The final column of Table 7 relaxes the assumption that capital adjusts perfectly to the 
expansion of the northern labor force. Instead, I assume that capital remains unchanged even as 
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the labor supply increases, resulting in a reduction in the capital-labor ratio and an associated 
decline in wages for all skill groups. This channel can be expressed as -(1-α) ΣiΣj (sijbΔLijb/Lijb) 
where α is share of income earned by the labor aggregate. For α = 0.7, the 4.5 percent increase in 
the total northern labor supply due to black migration would lead to an additional 1.3 percent 
decline in wages for all groups. As a result, black wages fall by 8.5 percent (rather than 7.2 
percent) and white wages fall by 1.0 percent (column 4). Whether one prefers the estimates in 
columns 2 or 4 depends on how responsive one believes capital to be.
46 However, the choice 
between an elastic or inelastic capital stock has no effect on the wage convergence results 
because capital adjustment would have an equal effect on both black and white wages. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Writing in the 1920s, W.E.B. Du Bois warned that the impending migration of a “great 
reservoir of [southern black] labor” to the North would generate competition for existing black 
workers in both the labor and housing markets.
47 The 1940s ushered in an era of inter-regional 
migration at levels that Du Bois could have hardly foreseen, driven in part by a war-time boom 
in northern industry. Between 1940 and 1970, southern migrants more than doubled the black 
labor supply above the Mason-Dixon line. New black arrivals reduced the wages of existing 
black workers in the North but had no effect on average white wages. I estimate that northern 
black wages would have grown by an additional 7 to 10 percent in the absence of southern 
migration. This finding modifies the current view of the Great Black Migration as a general 
avenue for black economic advancement. While migration was an important step in the 
                                                 
46 Ottaviano and Peri (2006) present evidence from the past three decades showing that capital is very responsive to 
immigrant arrivals. 




alleviation of black rural poverty, it was also impediment to black wage growth in the urban 
North. 
Beyond competition in the labor market, an influx of southern migrants may have 
generated other externalities for the northern black community. Prices and rents may have 
increased in black neighborhoods, schools may have overcrowded, and the level of parental 
education in the student body may have declined. On the other hand, migration may have 
amplified black political power in northern cities and, more speculatively, may have hastened the 
Civil Rights movement by recasting the “negro problem” as national – rather than simply a 
southern – concern.
48 A more complete assessment of the effect of black migration on the 
northern economy awaits further research. 
While this paper has focused on the black migration, competition between new and 
established migrants was likely a more general phenomenon in twentieth century cities. As this 
paper illustrates, the extent of competition between new and established migrants depends on the 
specificity (or generality) of skills held by a particular ethnic group and the presence (or absence) 
of discriminatory barriers. One implication of this framework – which remains to be tested – is 
that, ironically, first and second generation European immigrants may have benefited from the 
strict immigration quotas established in the 1920s. 
 
 
                                                 







The theoretical framework presents a Cobb-Douglas production function in which capital 
and a labor composite combine to produce output. This appendix describes the labor composite 
in more detail. I model the labor composite as a nested set of functions, each of which exhibit 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES). The layers of the labor composite include education 
groups (e) , experience levels within each education group (x), and two racial groups (black and 
white) within each education-experience cell (r). 
Total labor supply can be written as an aggregation of the contributions from each 
education group (Le): 
     
L = [Σe θeLe
(δ-1)/δ]
δ/(δ-1)        ( A 1 )  
 
The θe terms are technology parameters that shift the relative productivity of education groups 
(normalized to sum to one). The variable δ > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between 
workers with different levels of educational attainment.  
In turn, the labor supply of each education group is a combination of the contributions of 
workers with different levels of experience: 
     
Le = [Σx θexLex
(η-1)/η]
 η/(η-1)       ( A 2 )  
 
η measures the elasticity of substitution across experience levels within an education category. It 
is likely that workers are closer substitutes within education categories than across them; in this 
case, we expect η > δ. 
Finally, I allow black and white workers in the same skill group to be imperfect 
substitutes, perhaps due to discrimination in the labor market. The labor supply within an 
education-experience cell combines the contributions of black and white workers: 
   
   L ex = [θexwLexw
(σ-1)/σ
 + θexbLexb 
(σ-1)/σ]
σ/(σ-1)       (A3) 
 
The θexr terms (r = w, b) are race-specific productivity parameters and σ is the elasticity 
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Table 1: Regional differences in black-white wage convergence, 1940-1970 
 
Region 1940  1950-1940  1960-1950  1970-1960 
Northeast 0.466  -0.119  0.038  -0.047 
        
Midwest 0.436  -0.162  0.045  -0.069 
        
West 0.428  -0.137  0.034  -0.042 
        
South 0.689  -0.110  0.024  -0.089 
        
National 0.685  -0.187  0.017  -0.097 
Notes: The first column presents the log wage gap between black and white men in 1940. Subsequent columns show 
changes in this gap over the following three decades. Wages are reported for men aged 18-64 who are not living in 
group quarters, in the armed forces, or in the farm sector. In addition, men must not be enrolled in school, be self 
employed, or work part time. All states in the southern Census region are assigned to the South, with the exception 
of Delaware, the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Northeast contains the New England and Mid-Atlantic 
Census divisions (as well as Delaware, DC, and Maryland). The Midwest encompasses the East and West North 
Central Census divisions and the West includes the Mountain and Pacific divisions. 





Table 2. Southern migrant share of the northern labor force, 1940-1970 
 
                                 Total labor force    Black workers 
    
  
Share black 






All North      
1940  0.039 0.024 0.039 0.623 
      
1950  0.053 0.035 0.053 0.650 
      
1960  0.059 0.037 0.062 0.624 
      
1970  0.066 0.033 0.061 0.499 
      
0-5 yrs of school       
1940  0.125 0.092 0.042 0.745 
      
1950  0.201 0.160 0.079 0.796 
      
1960  0.230 0.195 0.143 0.849 
      
1970  0.176 0.106 0.129 0.601 
      
8-10 yrs of school      
1940  0.030 0.015 0.037 0.486 
      
1950  0.053 0.030 0.052 0.570 
      
1960  0.072 0.041 0.061 0.561 
      
1970  0.105 0.052 0.065 0.493 
Notes: Regional definitions are described in the notes to Table 1.  Means reported for men aged 18-64 who are not 
living in group quarters, in the armed forces, or in the farm sector. 









Table 3: Relative black labor supply and the black-white wage gap in the North, 1940-1970 
 
Migrant labor supply  Wages  As instrument for 
 ln(black/white)  ln(black)  ln(white)  total labor supply 
OLS      
ln(black/white) -0.120  -0.137  -0.017  -0.186 
   (0.048)   (0.049)   (0.017)   (0.089) 
        
Entered together      
ln(black) -0.124  -0.146  -0.022  -0.178 
    (0.052)    (0.051)   (0.014)   (0.087) 
        
ln(white)   0.083  0.052  -0.031  0.120 
   (0.057)   (0.060)   (0.019)  (0.071) 
        
IV      
ln(black/white) -0.090  -0.119  -0.029  -0.097 
    (0.068)   (0.069)   (0.021)   (0.085) 
        
Entered together      
ln(black) -0.088  -0.114  -0.027  -0.105 
   (0.069)   (0.068)   (0.017)  (0.085) 
        
ln(white) 0.061  0.058  -0.002  0.061 
 (0.101)  (0.105)    (0.029)  (0.085) 
Notes: N = 156. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by skill group. The labor supply 
count includes southern-born men working in the North between the ages of 18-64 who are not living in group 
quarters, in the armed forces, or in the farm sector. Annual earnings are calculated for northern-born men who, in 
addition to the sample restrictions above, are not enrolled in school, self employed or working part time. Skill 
groups are defined by five education categories and eight experience intervals. Observations are weighted by the 
size of the underlying northern-born sample used to calculate mean annual earnings. In column 4, the relative black-
white migrant labor supply is used as an instrument for total relative black-white labor supply. The first stage 
coefficient is 0.645 (s.e. = 0.110). In panel B, the instrument for black (white) migrant flow is the stock of southern-
born men by race living either in the North or the South. First stage results are reported in Table 4. 
Source: Ruggles, et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 
 





Table 4: First stage results: Predicting the flow of new southern migrants to the North 
using the stock of southern-born men within skill cells, 1940-1970 
 
 Migrant  flow 
Stock of southern born  ln(black/white)  ln(black)  ln(white) 
ln(black) 1.052  0.950  -0.101 
   (0.091)   (0.092)   (0.080) 
      
ln(white) -0.857  0.104  0.961 
    (0.126)   (0.128)   (0.111) 
Notes: N = 156. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by skill group. Skill groups are 
defined by five education categories and eight experience intervals. Observations are weighted by the size of the 
underlying northern-born sample used to calculate mean annual earnings. The sample restrictions and sources are 





Table 5: Relative black labor supply and the black-white wage gap in the North under 
alternate partitions of the labor force, 1940-1970 
 
   Wages  
Migrant labor supply  ln(black/white)  ln(black)  ln(white) 
Adjusted for term length     
ln(black/ white)  -0.042  -0.031  0.010 
   (0.025)   (0.030)   (0.006) 
     
ln(black) -0.041  -0.028  0.013 
   (0.025)   (0.028)   (0.005) 
     
ln(white)   0.035   -0.009  -0.049 
   (0.067)    (0.080)   (0.017) 
     
By  occupation     
ln(black/  white)  -0.090 -0.096 -0.005 
   (0.046)   (0.052)   (0.025) 
     
ln(black)  -0.108 -0.109 -0.000 
   (0.049)   (0.054)   (0.023) 
     
ln(white)   0.044   0.062  0.017 
   (0.080)   (0.080)   (0.039) 
     
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by skill group. The sample restrictions and 
sources are described in the notes to Table 3. 
Panel A: N = 156. Skill groups are defined by five education categories and eight experience intervals. Education 
categories are based on expected classroom days. Observations are weighted by the size of the underlying northern-
born sample used to calculate mean annual earnings.  
Panel B: N = 192. Skill groups are defined by six occupation categories and eight experience intervals. Observations 
are weighted by the size of the underlying northern-born used to calculate mean annual earnings. 
 





Table 6: Exploring the robustness of the relationship between relative black labor supply 
and the black-white wage gap 
 
A. Robustness    B. Sub-samples   
1. Add women to labor supply  -0.103  1. 6+ years of schooling only  -0.171 
   (0.057)  N = 128   (0.076) 
      
2. Drop if <25 blacks in cell  -0.179  2. 0-12 yrs of schooling only  -0.140 
N = 104   (0.103)  N = 124   (0.071) 
      
3. Add 40-50 yrs experience  -0.090  3. Only native-born whites  -0.126 
N = 186   (0.058)     (0.049) 
      
4. Redefine education categories  -0.080  4. Only foreign-born whites  -0.061 
   (0.037)     (0.075) 
Notes: OLS regressions comparable to Table 3, Panel A (coeff. = -0.120, s.e. = 0.048). The sample restrictions and 
sources are described in the notes to Table 3. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by skill 
group. Skill groups are defined by five education categories and eight experience intervals. Observations are 
weighted by the size of the underlying northern-born sample used to calculate mean annual earnings. Unless 
otherwise noted, N = 156. 





Table 7: Counterfactual wage increase for black men under a “no southern migration” 
scenario, By education category for 1940 through 1970 
 
  Alternate estimates of σ  
 OLS  IV 
Perfect 
substitution 







BLACK       
0-5 years  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011  0.001  0.006 
       
6-9 years  -0.008  -0.009  -0.012  0.005  0.015 
       
10-11  years  0.154 0.117 0.009 0.131 0.065 
       
12  years  0.243 0.184 0.008 0.198 0.066 
       
13+  years  0.162 0.121 0.002 0.135 0.022 
       
Mean  0.096 0.072 -0.002 0.085 0.036 
       
WHITE       
0-5 years  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011  0.001  -0.002 
       
6-9 years  -0.011  -0.012  -0.012  0.002  -0.003 
       
10-11  years  0.000 0.003 0.010 0.016 0.002 
       
12 years  -0.001  0.001  0.008  0.015  -0.001 
       
13+ years  -0.007  -0.006  0.002  0.008  -0.005 
       
Mean -0.005  -0.004  -0.000  0.010  -0.002 
         
DIFFERENCE  0.102 0.075 -0.002 0.075 0.038 
Notes: Counterfactual wage growth calculations are based on equations 6 and 7 in the text. Estimates of δ and η are 
reported in the text. Changes in labor supply due to black migration (ΔLexb/Lexb) and income shares for black 
workers by skill group (sexb) are calculated from the 1940 and 1970 IPUMS. Average wage effects are constructed 
by weighting the contributions of each skill group by their share of the total (race-specific) wage bill. Columns 1-4 
reflect different estimates of σ. Column 1 uses the OLS estimate in Panel A of Table 3. Column 2 uses the IV 
estimate from Panel B of Table 3. Column 3 is calculated under the assumption of perfect substitution by race within 
skill groups (σ = ∞). Column 4 assumes a fixed supply of capital in the North. Column 5 presents a similar 





Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics for men in the northern labor force, 1940-1970 
 






ln(black)  5.103 4.519 9.812 
 (1.127)  (1.170)    (0.424) 
     
ln(white) 7.728  5.162  10.127 
 (1.174)  (1.053)    (0.419) 
     
ln(black/white)  -2.863 -0.664 -0.319 
    (0.875) (0.669)   (0.165) 
Notes: Means within education-experience cells. Wages in 1999 dollars. The sample restrictions and sources are 




Figure 1: Educational attainment of men in the northern labor force  




















0-5 6-9 10-11 12 13+
Years of education
Notes: The sample includes all men working in the North in 1950 between the ages of 18-64 who are not living in 
group quarters, in the armed forces or in the farm sector.  Education categories loosely correspond to school levels: 
elementary (0-5 years); middle school (6-9 years); high school attendees (9-11 years); high school graduates (12 
years); and men with at least some college (13 years or more). 
Sources: Ruggles, et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 




Figure 2: Common occupations for northern-born men with exactly eight years of 
education by race, 1950 
 







































Notes: Graphs report the ten most common occupations held by either black or white men. These 15 categories 
employ 31.0 percent of blacks and 34.8 percent of whites. Occupations that employ at least 2 percent of men of both 
race are shaded. I omit two commonly held occupation categories – “laborer and operatives, not elsewhere 
classified.” 26.1 percent of blacks and 10.8 percent of whites are classified as “laborers, nec” 15.8 percent of blacks 
and 17.8 percent of whites are classified as “operatives, nec.” 
Sources: Ruggles, et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 
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